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Abstract
In this paper we address the question whether the shift in labour
supply curve is the only fundamental change capturing the negative
correlation between the growth rates of productivity and employment
in European countries in the last ￿fteen years. If this explanation is
correct then the labour demand curve did not shift in recent times,
keeping other features of the production function unchanged. This is
obviously a problem of identi￿cation. Thus, in this study we provide
some empirical evidence explaining the shifts in labour demand curve
over the same period. Our main conclusion is that the sluggish perfor-
mance of the European economy in the last ￿fteen years has a common
root in the large changes occurred in the labour market. We refer to
these changes as technological and non technological shocks. In our
model, adverse technological shocks shift the labour demand curve,
while positive non technological shocks shift the labour supply curve.
These two shifts contribute simultaneously to rise employment and to
decrease the growth rate of productivity. Our evidence shows that
labour productivity does respond positively to labour demand (tech-
nological) shocks and negatively to labour supply (non technological)
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1shocks. Hence, the main result of our study is that both shocks are nec-
essary to provide a complete picture of the employment-productivity
trade-o⁄ in European countries during the last ￿fteen years.
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21 Introduction
The object of this paper is shown in ￿g.1, which plots average labour produc-
tivity rates over 5-year intervals, from 1970 to 2006, for Europe as a whole
(EU15), for the main European countries and for USA.
Explaining this slowdown in Europe, both over time and across countries,
has proved to be a serious challenge. For much of the post-war period,
European growth was ￿catching up growth￿ . Firms operated in large and
protected markets. Aggregate investment was sustained by an expanding
aggregate consumption. Much of the spending in research and development
was self-￿nanced. The high elasticity of labour supply assured an increasing
level of employment and production with stable real wages and prices.
Nowadays, this model of growth has become dysfunctional. Most of
the European markets are open to international competition. Technolog-
ical progress is sustained by an increasingly amount of external ￿nancial
resources. Innovations, rather than imitation, are required to rise productiv-
ity. Finally, labour markets are characterised by a lower elasticity in labour
supply, with a rising trade o⁄ between wages and employment.
In the last ￿fteen years, the most concerning aspect of the labour pro-
ductivity￿ s evolution has been the further deceleration of its growth rate,
especially in the continental economies like Italy, Spain and France. Tradi-
tionally, in European countries, productivity has been above Usa level, but
it has lost some ground since mid-1990s. In addition, during the same period
labour productivity in USA has increased strongly. Unfortunately, as in Eu-
rope productivity growth rates have decreased the level of unemployment has
generally remained high or even increased. This fact has led to less emphasis
on the productivity slowdown, and more on the reasons for the di⁄erences
between European countries in their capability to create new jobs.
There is a wide consensus that, from the mid-1990s, the recovery of labour
utilization in the European economy comes from rising deregulation in labour
market and wage moderation. The labour supply-side approach explains the
recent slowdown of the labour productivity growth as a positive shift in
labour supply: the slowdown in the growth rate of productivity is only a short
run consequence of the increase in the employment rate, with productivity
recovery in the long run.
In this paper we address the question whether the shift in ￿labour sup-
ply￿curve is the only fundamental change capturing the negative correlation
between the growth rates of productivity and employment in European coun-
3Figure 1: Average labour productivity in EU15 and USA (growth rates by
countries).
4tries over the last ￿fteen years. If this explanation is correct then the ￿labour
demand￿curve did not shift in recent times, keeping other features of the
production function unchanged. This problem of identi￿cation may obvi-
ously account for the mixed empirical results found by several authors on
the relationship between shocks and productivity. For example, Hansen and
Wright (1992), Gamber and Joutz (1993), Chirinko (1995) and Christiano et
al. (2003) ￿nd evidence of procyclical productivity and wage, Gali￿(1999),
Gali￿et al. (2002) and Francis and Ramey (2003) ￿nd evidence of coun-
tercyclical productivity, and ￿nally Christiano et al. (2001) and Smets and
Wouters (2003) ￿nd evidence which requires a variety of stochastic distur-
bances to capture the evolution of productivity.
Thus, we provide some empirical evidence which explains the shifts in
labour demand from the beginning of 1990s. If technological shocks were at
work, we should have seen a variation in total factor productivity growth rate
(TFP) with shifts in production function and changes in capital deepening
and productivity. We look at data to investigate if they provide empirical
evidence in this direction.
Our main result is that the sluggish performance of the European econ-
omy in the last ￿fteen years has a common root in the large changes occurred
in labour market. We refer to these changes as technological and non tech-
nological shocks. In our model, adverse technological shocks shift the labour
demand curve, while positive non technological shocks shift the labour sup-
ply curve. These two shifts contribute simultaneously to rise employment
and to decrease the growth rate of productivity.
We ￿nd that labour productivity does respond positively to labour de-
mand shocks and negatively to labour supply shocks. This evidence is con-
sistent with economic theory. Our model predicts that technological shocks
generate a positive conditional correlation between employment and produc-
tivity. In turn, a negative conditional correlation between the two variables
arises from non technological shocks. A Structural Vector Autoregressive
(SVAR) model is employed to exploit the di⁄erent responses of labour pro-
ductivity and employment growth to each type of shocks. The remarkable
result of the econometric analysis is that both shocks are necessary to provide
a complete picture of the employment-productivity trade-o⁄ in European
countries during the last ￿fteen years.
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of the literature, in
section 3 the main basic facts characterizing the evolution of the European
economy in the last ￿fteen years will be presented. With an eye to the
5evolution of employment, productivity, capital deepening and capital share,
the dynamic properties of our model will be discussed in section 4, showing
that only a combination of shocks can account for the negative correlation
between employment and productivity. In the ￿fth section, we will identify
and estimate the component of employment and productivity growth rates
associated with alternative shocks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
There are innumerable papers dealing with the European economic perfor-
mance. But, almost all the papers study the opposite issue of the European
unemployment during the previous two decades (Layard et al. 1991; Phelps
1994; Blanchard 1997; Caballero and Hammour 1998; Bertola et al. 2002).
We can divide these contributions into two groups.
Firstly, most papers focus on shifts of labour supply, emphasizing the
e⁄ects of institutional changes on the level of (un)employment. We can label
this explanation as labour supply-side approach (Belot and Van Ours 2000,
2001; Nickell and Layard 1999; Nickell 2003). This strand of research is
well represented by Nickell et al. (2005). Their empirical evidence remarks
that in the last forty years the evolution of unemployment in Europe is well
explained by changes in labour market institutions.
Secondly, others focus on the interactions between shocks and institu-
tions. The central idea here is that the rigidity in labour market institutions
ampli￿es the initial shock (interest rate, aggregate demand, input price) with
a negative and persistent e⁄ect on the equilibrium level of unemployment.
The in￿ uential paper by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) is perhaps the most
notable example. They show that while adverse shocks can explain much
of the rise in unemployment, only the interactions between shocks and in-
stitutions can capture the heterogeneity of unemployment across European
countries from the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s.
An alternative line of research focuses instead on the recent labour pro-
ductivity slowdown. A large number of empirical papers study the deteri-
oration of the technological progress and its e⁄ect on labour productivity.
An adverse technological shock can explain the deceleration of the labour
productivity growth rate in European economy in the last ￿fteen years. (De-
nis and Roger 2004; Estevao 2004; O￿ Mahony and van Ark 2003; Timmer
and van Ark 2005; Gordon and Drew-Becker 2005). However, these papers
6do not provide an explicit theoretical foundation of this phenomenon, and
they do not relate the dynamics of technological progress to the evolution of
employment.
Thus, since the exact nature of the shocks, the relative importance of
them, and the mechanisms through which the shocks interact remain largely
to be established, we try to combine both types of shocks (a compromise). In
this perspective, the present study can be seen as an update of the previous
papers, and it is very close to DrŁze and Bean (1990) who study the e⁄ect
of capital accumulation in the rise of European unemployment, to Blanchard
(1997) who made the ￿rst attempt to explain the rising of unemployment
in Europe using a labour market model with shifts in both labour demand
and supply, and to Caballero and Hammour (1998) who analyse the e⁄ects
of labour market institutions on capital accumulation and employment.
3 Some basic facts
To begin our analysis, it is worth looking at the next six tables in ￿gure 2.
They show the breakdown of the GDP growth rate in its main components
over the period 1971-2006, for the main European countries and for Usa.
Figures in tables are average growth rates.
For Usa, average growth rates of GDP remained largely stable along the
entire period, with an acceleration of labour productivity, and a deceler-
ation of the employment rate in the last ￿fteen years. This evolution is
accompanied by an increase in both average growth rate of TFP and capital
deepening.
In turn, in Europe four ￿basic facts￿make the point from the begin-
ning of 1990s:
1. European countries have experienced important changes in labour mar-
ket institutions with an increase in labour utilization, after two decades
of rising unemployment.
2. During the same period the recovery in labour utilization was accom-
panied by a corresponding negative trend in the growth rate of labour
productivity.
3. There is a strong decline in TFP growth rate as well. This deceleration
has also a⁄ected the growth of labour productivity.
7Figure 2: Breakdown of GDP in its components . Total economy. (1971-2006,
growth rates. Employment is expressed in total hours worked for total economy.
** Germany before uni￿cation. * After riuni￿cation. Author￿ s calculation from
Ameco database).
8Figure 3: Employment rates and labour productivity trend (5-year moving
average).
4. The growth rate of capital deepening has decreased, signaling that
￿rms switched to more labour-intensive forms of production (low qual-
ity labour). This change in the ratio of capital to labour may re￿ ect
biased technological adoption.
Thus, we should study why European countries have adopted capital-
saving technology in the last ￿fteen years, ￿nding pro￿table to move towards
technology with a lower productivity growth rate. Figures 3 and 4 are the
graphical counterparts of these evidence.
At these four basic facts we add a ￿fth equally important: the rise in
capital share over the past ￿fteen years in European countries, especially in
continental countries. The ￿rst panel in ￿gure 5 shows that in continental
economies shares stand at higher level today than at the end of 1980s. Fur-
ther, the second panel shows the pattern of capital share in UK and USA.
While in UK capital share increased with a partial decrease in the last years,
9Figure 4: The trend of total factor productivity and capital deepening (5-year
moving average).
10in USA it remained quite stable around 37 per cent, con￿rming the old styl-
ized fact of a constant capital share for USA economy.
The comparative dynamics of these historical data provides a ￿rst out-
come. In European countries and in Usa, the last ￿fteen years witnessed a
reversal of the traditional roles of employment and productivity in contribut-
ing to growth. In Europe, the recovery of labour utilization was accompanied
by a corresponding negative trend of labour productivity. This recent perfor-
mance marks a serious downgrading relative to the early 1990s when annual
labour productivity growth was about 2.4 per cent, compared with 1.4 per
cent for Usa. Since then there has been a reversal in fortunes, with the
European countries￿ s labour productivity growth rate declining on average
by roughly 1 per cent point, and with the USA￿ s accelerating by a simi-
lar amount. From a growth accounting perspective, the 1 percentage point
decline in European labour productivity emanates from two sources. About
50 per cent can be attributed to a reduction in the contribution of capital
deepening. The remaining part emanates from the deterioration of TFP.
Nonetheless, during the same period capital share in European economy has
increased.
3.1 Temporary versus permanent slowdown.
Is the slowdown in labour productivity growth rate likely a permanent or
a temporary phenomenon linked to labour market reforms? To answer this
question, it is helpful to look at the following graphs in ￿gure 6, showing the
scatter between the growth rates of labour productivity and employment in
European countries from 1990 to 2006.
This comparison shows the existence of a negative (and some times near
zero) unconditional correlation between these two variables. The trend line
has a negative slope, and for Italy, Spain, UK and USA it is a statistically
signi￿cative linear relationship.1 Looking at these data we could be tempted,
at ￿rst sight, to interpret the negative correlation as a movement along the
labour demand curve, or as a shift in labour supply curve. This is what we
have called the labour supply-side approach.
This interpretation explains the recent productivity slowdown as a re-
sponse of the economy to a positive labour supply shock. The shock to
1See Hansen and Wright (1992) for a discussion of the employment-productivity puzzle:
and Gali￿(1999) for the anomalies regarding the labour market predictions of RBC models.
11Figure 5: Capital Share (Capital income/GDP. Capital income includes pro￿ts,
interest rates paid by ￿rms, and pro￿t taxes. Ameco database).
12labour supply could be the result of labour market reforms and wage mod-
eration. It could also re￿ ect an increasing immigration of unskilled workers
with a lower reservation wage. These changes could have contributed to an
increase in labour force participation. Under this interpretation, a slower
wage growth could have led to a temporary decline in the capital-labour ra-
tio with a deceleration in labour productivity growth. Once full employment
is attained, wage and productivity growth could accelerate again and the
economy could go back to a higher productivity level. The recent decline in
productivity growth could be regarded as a temporary phenomenon.
But, how much does the decrease in productivity growth re￿ ect an in-
crease in employment? How much might it re￿ ect a decrease of both tech-
nological progress and capital deepening? Can we be sure a priori that the
labour demand curve did not shift in recent times, so that the deceleration
in labour productivity is only a short-run phenomenon?
The answer is obviously hard. Nonetheless, we ￿nd useful the follow-
ing exercise. If we are willing to assume that multiple shocks a⁄ect the
equilibrium in labour market, then we can construct an explanation of the
productivity slowdown which depends on both the shifts of supply and de-
mand of labour. Our explanation looks at a possible interaction between
technological and non technological shocks. We call technological shocks the
change in the growth rate of TFP, and non technological shocks the insti-
tutional changes in labour market, with their e⁄ects on regulation and wage
moderation.
We o⁄er the following explanation of the ￿basic facts￿ . Firms reacted to
deregulation in labour market (positive non technological shocks in supply)
reducing capital deepening, switching towards more labour-intensive technol-
ogy and hiring low quality labour. The initial e⁄ect has been to rise capital
shares and to reduce the growth rate of productivity. However, since mid
1990s, labour market has been characterized by an adverse shift in labour
demand. One explanation of this shift is the deceleration in the growth rate
of technological progress, as it is shown by the evolution of TFP (negative
technological shock). Moving away from skilled labour, ￿rms led to a de-
crease in the growth rate of technological progress with a further negative
impact on productivity.
We employ a labour market model with shifts in labour supply and de-
mand to explore this interpretation. We make two main assumptions. Firstly,
as in the Solow￿ s model, we assume that the rate of technological progress af-
fects labour productivity and capital intensity in the steady state. Secondly,
13Figure 6: Scatter between labour productivity and employment growth rates.
Historical data. (Period 1990-2006. Quarterly data. Eurostat database, OECD
database and Federal Reserve of St.Louis database. Germany 1993-2006)
14we assume that the equilibrium in labour market is a⁄ected by institutions
and by changes in institutions.
The result of these assumptions is presented in ￿gure 7. It illustrates the
interaction between shocks in labour market. The long run equilibrium shifts
from E0 to E1, where employment rate is higher and labour productivity
growth rate is permanently reduced. Labour supply curve is a⁄ected by
non technological shocks. Thus, the e⁄ect of deregulation is to shift labour
supply down to the right, along the demand curve. In short run, labour
productivity decreases as well as unemployment moving towards point A.
However, this point cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, technological shocks
a⁄ect the position of the labour demand curve. Let￿ s consider an adverse
shock in technological progress.2 Its e⁄ect is to decrease the growth rate
of labour productivity, shifting permanently the labour demand curve down
to the left. The uc line in ￿gure 7 represents ideally the trend line of the
previous scatters: two shifts originating from two types of shocks can provide
a negative unconditional correlation.
The main implication of this scenario is that technological progress af-
fects permanently the steady state, acting on both labour productivity and
employment. Hence, we have a prediction on the sign of the conditional cor-
relations. For technological shocks, the conditional correlation between the
growth rates of employment and productivity must be positive: given labour
supply and institutions, it re￿ ects the shift in labour demand curve caused
by technological changes. For non technological shock, the conditional cor-
relation must be negative: given labour demand and technological progress,
it re￿ ects the shift in labour supply curve caused by institutional changes.
We build up a theoretical labour market model in which employment and
2Speaking of adverse technological shocks is just for sake of exposition. Indeed, we can
formally represent the changes in labour market in terms of variation of growth rates.
Let the production function be Y = AN1￿￿, with A the labour-augmenting techno-
logical progress, and 1 ￿ ￿ the income share of labour. The marginal productivity is







the labour demand curve has a negative slope, and it shifts downwards to the left whenever
the technological progress decelerates.
Similarly, the labour supply curve can be expressed as w = ￿N; where ￿ is a black box











￿the supply curve shifts downwards to the left, increasing employment.
15productivity react to each shock. Then, we will identify and estimate the
components of the productivity and employment associated with the two
alternative shocks using a SVAR model.
Figure 7: An interaction between technological and non technological shocks.
4 The model
This model is a version of Blanchard (1997). The main di⁄erence is that in
this version the technological shock modi￿es permanently the steady state of
labour market.
Let￿ s assume that every ￿rm uses one unit of capital. When the single
￿rm chooses the amount of labour to hire, it also decides the corresponding
labour to capital ratio. For the single ￿rm the optimal labour demand is
given by the solution of the following Bellman￿ s equation:














16In this equation, v (n) is the value of the ￿rm expressed as a function of the
labour-capital ratio, n: As usual, the left-hand side of this equation is the
cost of ￿nancing the ￿rm, since ￿ is the user cost of capital. The right-hand
side is the market value of the ￿rm given by the operating pro￿ts plus the
capital gain. A is the technological progress. To get an analytical solution we
assume that the operating pro￿t is the di⁄erence between the real value of





2 that the ￿rm has to bear to adjust (hiring and ￿ring) labour.
The ￿rst-order and the envelope conditions are:
c_ n = vn
￿vn = A(1 ￿ ￿)n
￿￿ ￿ w + vnn (n) _ n
and putting vn = q; the previous conditions become:
c_ n = q
￿q = A(1 ￿ ￿)n￿￿ ￿ w + _ q (2)
The ￿rst equation says that the ￿rm will increase employment up to the
point where its marginal value q is equal to the adjustment cost, c_ n: Then,
from the second equation we get that along the optimal path the marginal
cost of ￿nancing the ￿rm ￿q must be equal to the marginal value of the ￿rm.











which provides the value of the ￿rm.
The ￿rm must decide whether it is convenient to keep producing or exit
the market. It compares its current value v (n) to the cost of one unit of
capital. This cost depends on the market demand for capital. Hence, the
unit cost of capital pk can be written as the sum of its direct cost normalized
to 1 plus an adjustment cost which depends on the aggregate investment _ K :
pk = 1 + h _ K (4)
Free entry implies that:
v (n) = 1 + h _ K (5)




[v (n) ￿ 1] (6)
Now, let￿ s focus on the labour market equations.
The aggregate labour demand is simply the sum of the individual de-
mands, that is:
N = nK
For the labour supply we assume that it is a linear increasing function
of real wage. At market level, if the labour force is normalized to 1; we can
write:
w = ￿N (7)
As we said above, ￿ is a black box representing the labour market institutions,
with its variations giving account of institutional changes. The labour market
equilibrium is then given by:
w = ￿nK (8)
Finally, by assumption the user cost of capital ￿ is an exogenous variable de-
￿ned by international competition in capital markets. With a Cobb-Douglas
production function this assumption implies that the real wage is ￿xed in the
long run to the level w￿:








_ q = ￿q ￿ [A(1 ￿ ￿)n￿￿ ￿ w]
_ K = 1
h (v ￿ 1)
(9)
In order to study the properties of this system, we begin determining the
steady state of the economy. Since from the second equation of (9) we have
that in equilibrium _ q = q = 0, the steady state real wage is:
w
￿ = A(1 ￿ ￿)n
￿￿￿ (10)
that is w￿ is equal to the marginal product of capital. Then, since in steady
state the marginal product of capital must be equal to the user cost (which
is what the Bellman equation states), we have:
￿ = y ￿ wn
= ￿An
1￿￿


















Substituting these latter values in the labour supply equation we get the























We use these two solutions to linearise the system (9) in the neighborhood
of the steady state. It can be shown that the system has two state variables
(K and N) and one jump variable (q) (see Appendix A for details). This
means that its dynamics is characterised by a stable saddle path.
4.1 Non technological shock
Suppose that the system is initially in steady state. Then, given employment,
a non technological shock reduces the value of ￿: This variation decreases the
slope of labour supply and the corresponding wage. At a given level of capital
stock, the lower wage increases labour demand rising the labour-capital ratio.
These e⁄ects are shown in ￿gure 8 where equilibrium shifts from E to A:
In the long run, however, the decrease of wage rises the ￿rm￿ s value
making attractive to enter in the market. As a result, both capital and
employment increase and the labour demand curve shifts to the right, moving
the economy towards the new steady state: In E0 the level of employment
has increased and the labour productivity has returned to its initial level.
Note that in the long run the non technological shock does not change the
labour-capital ratio, although it does increase the use of both the inputs.
The dynamics of the system is described in ￿gure 9. The parameters
values are: ￿ = 0:15; ￿ = 0:3, h = 10; c = 4; A = 0:5: The initial value
19Figure 8: A greater labour ￿ exibility.
of ￿ is ￿0 = 0:385; for analytical simplicity, the initial value of the labour-
capital ratio is n0 = 1, so that K0 =
w0
￿0n0 = 0:909; and employment is
N0 = n0K0 = 0:909: We then suppose a reduction (which means a positive
non technological shock) of ￿; such that its value is reduced to ￿1 = 0:35:
4.2 Technological shock
Now, let us focus on adverse technological shocks, that is a decrease in the
value of A. In our model, only technological shocks have a permanent e⁄ect
on labour productivity. The impact of this shock is shown in ￿gure 10 where
the labour demand curve shifts down to the left, a⁄ecting permanently the
steady state.
The slowdown of the technological progress has an initial e⁄ect on pro￿t
rate, wage and labour-capital ratio. Indeed, the reduction in productivity
leads the ￿rm to invest less in the long run, modifying the steady state:
given the user cost ￿, a lower productivity can only be o⁄set by a lower
wage in the long run. Eventually, this change leads to an increase of the
labour-capital ratio.
Note, however, that the technological shock reduces permanently employ-
20Figure 9: The dynamic e⁄ects of a greater labour ￿ exibility.
ment in the long run. This outcome con￿ icts with one of the stylized facts
seen above, i.e. the increase of labour utilization during the 1990s. The
slowdown of technological progress is thus a potential, even if incomplete,
explanation of the European economic dynamics in the last ￿fteen years.
The adjustment paths of the system are described in ￿gure 11. The
parameters values used are: ￿ = 0:15; ￿ = 0:3, h = 10; c = 4; ￿ = 0:35: The
initial value of A is A0 = 0:5; we then have an adverse shock to A such that
the new level is A1 = 0:49:
4.3 An interaction between shocks
In this simulation we analyse the interaction between shocks. We study the
combined e⁄ect of a decrease of ￿ and A. Figure 12 shows that, in this
scenario, the steady state shifts from E to E0:
Comparing the two steady state equilibria, we note that two e⁄ects arise:
employment increases while labour productivity decreases. The rise of em-
21Figure 10: A slowdown in technological progress.
ployment is originated in the deregulation. On the other hand, the reduction
of both wage and productivity depends on the slowdown of the technological
progress. Since the user cost ￿ is exogenously given, the lower productivity of
labour must be o⁄set by a decrease in capital accumulation to rise marginal
productivity of capital. This implies an increase of the labour-capital ratio
in the long run.
As before, the dynamics of the system is described in ￿gure 13. The
parameters values are: ￿ = 0:15; ￿ = 0:3, h = 10; c = 4; ￿ = 0:385; A = 0:5:
Then, both A and ￿ are reduced to ￿1 = 0:35 and A1 = 0:48 to simulate the
combined e⁄ect of the two shocks:
In summary, two lessons can be drawn from all these simulations. Firstly,
technological shocks can potentially explain the slowdown in labour produc-
tivity since the early 1990s. Secondly, we need two separate shocks to capture
the joint behavior of employment and productivity. Technological shocks,
shifting permanently the labour demand curve down to the left, can cap-
ture the adverse evolution of productivity; non technological shocks, shifting
labour supply curve down to the right, can capture the increase in the level
of employment.
22Figure 11: The dynamic e⁄ects of the slowdown in technological progress.
5 Empirical results
The previous model provides the identifying restrictions for the structural
VAR. Note that these restrictions allow permanent e⁄ects of technological
shock on both productivity and employment. Following Gali￿(1999) we do
not restrict technological shocks not to have permanent e⁄ect on employ-
ment. We know that only a combination of technological and non technolog-
ical shocks can capture the ￿basic facts￿ . However, in the empirical analysis
we add a third shock. As it is in Blanchard and Quah (1989), to identify
the aggregate demand component of labour productivity and employment we
impose that aggregate demand has no long run impact on productivity and
employment.3 These restrictions follow from the assumption that the Nairu
holds in the long run.
The data used to estimate the SVAR are total employment in full-time
3These same assumptions are used by Gamber and Joutz (1993) to identify the aggre-
gate demand component of real output and productivity.
23Figure 12: Interaction between shocks.
equivalent for Italy, France and Spain; total employment for UK; and civil-
ian employment for USA. Then, we employ real GNP to calculate labour
productivity, and real aggregate demand. Data are quarterly.4 We interpret
the observed variation in (log) productivity (p), (log) employment (l) and
(log) demand (d) as originating from three types of shocks, whose impact is





















5 = C(L)￿t (13)
In the matrix C(L); we ￿nd the polynomials Cij(L) with individual coe¢ -
cients denoted by cij(k): The innovations ￿p; ￿l and ￿d represent the structural
shocks on labor demand and supply. To resume, the long-run restrictions are:
1. technological shocks have a long run impact on the log of labour pro-
ductivity, employment and aggregate demand;
4The database employed in the econometric analysis is obtained by Eurostat, OECD
and the Federal Reserve of St.Louis.
24Figure 13: The dynamic e⁄ects of two shocks
2. non technological shocks have a long run e⁄ects on the log of employ-
ment and aggregate demand, but they do not a⁄ect labour productiv-
ity;5
3. aggregate demand shocks have only short run impacts on the growth
rate of employment and productivity.










5This restriction is implied by the Solow growth model with a Cobb Douglas production
function. In this model, marginal productivity of labour depends on the capital-labour
ratio and this latter is constant in steady state. Hence, any change in labour supply (non
technological shock) will lead to an equal percentage change in capital stock.
25Assuming the shocks are ordered technological, non technological and
aggregate demand the above restrictions says that the secular component in
labour productivity originates in the technological shocks, and the coe¢ cient
C11(1) identi￿es the long run multiplier of this shock. In turn, the zeros in
the matrix (14) imply that both employment and aggregate demand shocks
do not a⁄ect the log of productivity in the long run (however, they may well
have short and medium run e⁄ects on it), but that the secular component of
the log of employment depends on both technological and non technological
shocks.6
The moving-average speci￿cation is based on the assumption that the
growth rates of variables are stationary. This assumption is motivated by the
outcome of the standard Dickey-Fuller tests and Phillips-Perron tests which
reject the null of unit root when applied to the ￿rst di⁄erences of log. Two
di⁄erent speci￿cations of the variables in VAR are run to test the robustness
of the result. In the ￿rst case (speci￿cation A) we remove no means and no
trends. In the second case, we remove a mean growth shift for employment
and aggregate demand after 1992 and we detrend the employment rate.7 We
present results from speci￿cation A.
Figure 14 reports estimates of both unconditional and conditional corre-
lations between the growth rates of employment and productivity, over the
period 1975-2006.8 The unconditional correlation is reported in the ￿rst col-
umn. As we said above, this correlation is negative in all countries, and,
in some case, near zero. However, the SVAR analysis allows to disentan-
gle the intricate e⁄ects of the di⁄erent shocks in generating the correlation.
Our benchmark estimates of conditional correlations are reported in the sec-
ond and third columns. They are consistent with our theoretical model
6The polynomial
P1
k=0 cij(k) = Cij(1) = 0 implies that a speci￿c structural shock has
no e⁄ect on the level of variables in the long-run .
7The VAR contains from four to eight lags depending on the speci￿cation of the dynamic
model. The impulse response functions are similar across alternative treatments of lags,
breaks and time trends.
8The estimates of conditional correlations are obtained applying the formulas provided
by Gali￿(1999, p.257). It is interesting to compare our decomposition to the one provided
by Hansen and Wright (1992), Gali￿(1999) and Christiano et al. (2003). The signi￿cance
of the correlation index is obtained applying the formula t = r p
(1￿r2)=(n￿2); where t is the
Student￿ s t, r is the correlation and n the size of the sample. The t value is distributed
approximately with n￿2 degrees of freedom. Application of this formula to any particular
observed sample value of r will test the null hypothesis that the observed value comes from
a population in which r = 0:
26Figure 14: Correlation Estimates for the European countries and Usa. Total
economy. (Growth rates. Quarterly data for the period 1975:1-2006:3. t values are
in parentheses (125 degrees of freedom). Signi￿cance is indicated by one asterisk
(10-percent level) or two asterisks (5-percent level)).
of labour market. We get a positive correlation between the growth rates
of productivity and employment conditional on technological shocks; and a
negative conditional correlation to non technological shocks. Thus, the his-
torical correlation provided by the data can be reconciled with shifts in both
the demand and the supply curve in labour market: productivity responds
positively to technological shocks and negatively to non technological shocks.
Figures 15 and 16 provide the graphical counterpart of the previous evidence.
To clarify the reason of the historical decomposition, it is helpful to look
at the impulse response functions estimated from the SVAR. Because of the
similarity in the features, in ￿gure 17 we report only the basic case for Italy
and France.9
Both productivity and employment response positively to a one-unit tech-
nological shock. We interpret the impact of this shock as a shift of the labour
demand curve along the supply curve. This comovement does not explain
entirely the evolution of employment: the order of magnitude of the em-
9The impulse response functions for the other three countries are close to these. The
main di⁄erence lies in the magnitudes of the responses.
27Figure 15: Productivity vs. employment. Historical data, technological com-
ponent, and non technological component (Italy, Spain, France).
28Figure 16: Productivity vs. employment. Historical data, technological com-
ponent, and non technological component (UK and USA).
29Figure 17: Estimated impulse response function of employment and produc-
tivity.
30ployment response is smaller than the productivity variation over the same
period. Thus, technological shocks appear as the main source of the produc-
tivity slowdown, while it does not capture the actual changes in employment.
The second two panels in ￿gure 17 show that employment increases per-
manently to a non technological shock, while labour productivity decreases
temporarily in response to the same shock. We interpret this response as the
shift of the supply curve along the demand curve. This dynamics is coherent
with the adjustment path described by the labour market model. The im-
pact on productivity of the non technological shock is negative in the short
run, with labour productivity recovery in the long run. In the new steady
state, the rise in (log) employment is associated to an unchanged level for
(log) labour productivity.
Finally, the bottom two panels in ￿gure 17 show that aggregate demand
has only a short run e⁄ect on the growth rates of employment and produc-
tivity. This shock is initially associated with a positive productivity e⁄ect.
This is plausible since in short run an expansion of aggregate demand rises
the level of GDP and of capital utilization. But, as this initial impact fades
away, productivity and employment return to their original levels, so that
the initial impact vanishes over time.
Thus, our evidence suggests that only the contemporaneous shift of both
labour demand and supply can appropriately explain the trade-o⁄ between
the employment and productivity growth rates occurred in European coun-
tries during the last ￿fteen years. The contribution of the technological shock
can explain the main part of the slowdown in labour productivity growth,
while it is unable to explain the evolution of employment. A similar interpre-
tation holds for the change of employment which, generally, at longer horizon
re￿ ects responses to non technological shocks.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided an explanation of the productivity slowdown
puzzle in European countries during the last ￿fteen years. We have found
that both shifts in labour supply and demand are necessary to give a cor-
rect explanation of this adverse evolution. These two shifts have contributed
simultaneously to rise employment and to decrease the growth rate of pro-
ductivity. These ￿ndings have three main implications for the current debate
on the European productivity slowdown.
31Firstly, the responses to shocks of productivity and employment are dif-
￿cult to reconcile with theories focusing only on one side of labour market.
A more helpful approach is to interpret the productivity slowdown as the in-
teraction between technological and non technological shocks. These shocks
act on the equilibrium in labour market, a⁄ecting both labour supply and
demand.
Secondly, as said above, one interpretation of the ￿basic facts￿we pre-
sented at the very beginning of our study is that ￿rms reacted to labour
market reforms in 1990s reducing capital deepening and hiring low quality
labour. The initial e⁄ect of this choice has been to rise capital shares. But,
moving away from skilled labour had the main consequence to decrease the
growth rate of technological progress with an adverse impact on both the
growth rate of labour productivity and GDP. Hence, labour market reforms
resulted in unintended and undesirable consequences for capital accumulation
and productivity.
Thirdly, the predictions of our model provide a non optimistic message
about the future of the European economy. Actually, the rise in labour uti-
lization might lead to slower capital accumulation and technological progress
in the long run, with obvious consequence on both productivity and growth.
Thus, the further outcome of our analysis is the policy implication that with
two goals (employment and productivity) more than an instrument (labour
market reforms) is needed to increase employment without depressing pro-
ductivity. The policy to remedy to this situation appears much more complex
than the ones drawn from the traditional labour supply explanation.
To conclude, we believe that the hypotheses employed in this paper are
a plausible set of assumptions. A more comprehensive approach is needed.
In this perspective, the European productivity slowdown puzzle can well be
explained by the intricate interplay of technological and non technological in
labour market over the last ￿fteen years.
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34A Appendix. Stability analysis
In this appendix we study the stability of the system (9). We show that the
steady state is a saddle point with a unique stable path. For convenience,








_ q = ￿q ￿ [A(1 ￿ ￿)n￿￿ ￿ w]
_ K = 1
h (v ￿ 1)
(15)
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The variables with bar indicate deviations from the steady state ￿for in-
stance, ￿ n = n ￿ n￿. d is the labour marginal product in steady state, d =
A(1 ￿ ￿)n￿￿￿; g is its derivative in absolute value, g = Aa(1 ￿ ￿)n￿￿￿￿1; p
is the output in steady state, p = An￿1￿￿:










































35where in the previous expression we have taken into account that in equilib-
rium the demand wage is equal to the supply wage, so that d￿ n = ￿K￿n￿￿ n:
From the previous system we get the characteristic equation:

























Since the sequence of the signs is ￿ ? +; it is straightforward to conclude
that there are two negative roots and a positive one. Thus, the equilibrium
is a saddle: that is, there is only one path to the steady state.10 Intuitively,
this result derives from the presence of two state variables (n and K), whose
number must equal the number of negative roots, and one jump variable,
which is q the marginal value of the ￿rm (Gandolfo 1997, pp.401-3).
We can eliminate the positive root to converge on the saddle path. De-
noting the two negative roots with ￿1 and ￿2; and the eigenvectors with con
v and w; we write the solution of the system (15) as:
nt = ￿v1 exp(￿1t) + ￿w1 exp(￿2t) + n
￿
Kt = ￿v2 exp(￿1t) + ￿w2 exp(￿2t) + K
￿
qt = ￿v3 exp(￿1t) + ￿w3 exp(￿2t) + q
￿
where ￿ and ￿ are determined by the initial conditions of the state variables:
n0 = ￿v1 + ￿w1 + n
￿
K0 = ￿v2 + ￿w2 + K
￿
We use these solutions to simulate the model.
10It can be shown that this is true even when there are complex roots, so that we cannot
apply Cartesio rule.
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